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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The Supreme Court in recent decisions has voiced the opinion that
membership in or affiliation with subversive organizations, with knowledge
of its subversive character is a necessary element which must be implicit
in a loyalty oath, 4 but the instant case is the first in which such an oath
has been held unconstitutional on that basis. Recognizing that membership in subversive organizations may be innocent, the Court held that
constitutional protection does extend to arbitrary and discriminatory
exclusion of public employees.'' The Court reasoned that under the
statute the fact of association, no matter how innocent, determines disloyalty and disqualification, and that the statute is therefore an arbitrary
assertion of power which offends due process.
The writer feels that the instant case has established a requirement
necessary to the practicability of loyalty oaths. Knowing membership in
subversive orgainzations must be made implicit in loyalty oaths so that
members ignorant of the real purpose of such organizations will be protected. It is not clear, under the instant case, whether a constitutional
right to public employment exists, the Court having circumvented the
problem. It is submitted that the decision is possibly a trend toward a
view by the Supreme Court that public employment is "property" within
the meaning of the due process clause.
John L. Remsen
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
Plaintiff claimed privilege against the testimony of the doctor who
had examined her prior to accident. Held, the statute' forbidding doctors
to furnish reports of mental or physical examinations to others does not
create a physician-patient privilege in Florida. Morrison v. Malmquist,
62 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1953).
The patient's privilege against the testimony of his physician did
not exist at common law.2 It is an American statutory innovation origadditional oath since statute made persons who advocate overthrow of government by
force or violence ineligible for public office). Loyalty oaths have been held unconstitutional in isolated cases. See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 45 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.
WVis. 1942) (non-comnmunist oath required of applicants for employment); Danskin v. San
Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal.2d. 506, 171 P.2d. 885 (1946) (loyalty oath
required for use of school auditorium); Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev. 64 (1871) (oath
required as prerequisite to voting).
14. See Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 494 (1952); Garner v.
Board of Public Works, 341 U. S. 716, 723, 724 (1951); Cerende v. Board of Elections, 341 U. S. 56, 57 (1951).
15. See United Mine Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
1. FLA. STAT. § 458.16 (1951).
2. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Ia. 195, 182 So. 911 (1938);
8 WcMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d ed. 1940).

CASES NOTED
inating in New York in I8283 which has since been followed by thirty of the
United States. 4 The privilege does not exist if not created by statute.5
Where it has been created by statute, the privilege may be treated as
remedial and subject to liberal interpretation and application, or as being
in derogation of the common law and subject to strict interpretation and
application.7 Perhaps because of the volume of criticism that has been
leveled at the privilege, there is a general tendency to limit it, either by
judicial or legislative action. This trend is exemplified by legislation that
suit for personal injuries waives the privilege, 8 or decisions to the effect
that the privilege exists only where the examination of the patient is
for the purpose of treatmentY The privilege is also limited by making it
applicable only to civil cases,' 0 by refusing to extend its application to
testimony of nurses'' or other attendants' 2 present at the time of consultation (unless they are specifically included in the statute creating the
privilege), by exempting the privilege from actions on policies of insurance,'1 and by holding that detailed testimony by the patient as to condition and treatment waives the privilege.'
However, the privilege is not always limited, and it has been held
to apply in hearings before an administrative agency as well as in judicial
proceedings.' 5 It has also been held that hospital records and documents
are included within the scope of the privilege;' and that testimony of a
physician, not excluded from evidence by the physician-patient privilege,
will be excluded under the attorney-client privilege if the physician can
he considered the agent of the attorney. 7
1940).

3. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 352.
4. For a discussion of the statutes consult 8 \VsctoIRE,

EVIDENCE § 2380

(3d ed.

5. Dyer v. State, 241 Ala. 679, 4 So.2d 311 (1941); Zciner v. Zciner, 120 Conn.
161, 179 Atl. 644 (1935); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195,
182 So. 911 (1938).
6. N. Y. City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
7. Rhodes v. Metropolitan life Ins. Co., 172 F.2d 183 (5th Cit.), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 930 (1949); Southwest Metals Co. v. Gornez, 4 F.2d 215 (9th Cit. 1925);
Meyers v. State, 192 Ind. 592, 137 N.E. 547 (1922).
8. CAL. CODL CIv. PROC. § 1881.4 (1941); Mien. Co,.LAws § 617.62 (1948).
9. San Francisco v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 37 Cal.2d. 27, 231 P.2d
26 (1951); Bassil v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Mich. 173, 270 N.V. 258 (1936).
10. Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa, 392, 45 A.2d 43, cert. denied, 328 U.S. 847,
rehearing denied, 328 U.S. 880 (1946).
11. First Trust Co. of St. Paul v.Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 48 (8th Cir.
1935); Southwest Metals Co. v. Gomez., 4 F.2d 215 (9th Cit. 1925); Leusink v.
O'Donnell, 255 Vis. 627, 39 N.W. 675 (1949).
12. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America v. Kozlowski, 226 Wis. 641, 276 NW.
300 (1937); 13 N. Y. INs. LAw § 149 stbd. 4 (interpreting this statute) Roth v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of United States, 186 Misc. 403, 59 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup.
Ct. 1945), aff'd, 27 App. Div. 923, 61 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dp't 1946).
14. Friesen v. Reimer, 24 Neb. 620, 247 N.W. 561 (1933); Capron v. Douglas,
193 N.Y. 11, 85 N.E. (1908); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McKim, 54 Ohio App. 66,
6 N.E.2d 9 (1935).
15. N. Y. City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
16. Green v. Nirenberg Sons, 166 Misc. 652, 3 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
17. San Francisco v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d

26 (1951).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Various reasons have been assigned to support the physician-patient
privilege. Generally, the emphasis is placed oih stimulating a full disclosure by the patient to his physician to allow the most effective medical
treatment,'
Other reasons given in support of the privilege are the
protection of the sensibilities and right of privacy of the patient by preventing public disclosure of his maladies,'8 or a desire to give the patient
20
complete control over information relative to his condition.
Most legal scholars who have considered the privilege do not accredit
the reasons advanced in its favor and have long been united in disapproval
of creation of the privilege. 2' In practice the privilege is most often
asserted in three major classes of litigation in which medical testimony
is most essential for disclosure of the full truth - actions on life insurance
policies where misrepresentations of the deceased as to health are at
issue, actions for bodily injuries where the plaintiff's bodily condition
is at issue, and testamentary actions in which the mental state and capacity
of the testator are at issue. 22 Critics of the privilege hold that its usual
effect is to obscure justice by suppressing the facts most revelant to the
issue in the interest of protecting the patient against possible embarrassing
28
disclosures.
The interpretation given the 1951 Florida Statute is commendable.
The value of the physician-patient privilege is, at most, doubtful. The
statute itself gives no clear indication of a legislative intent to create such
physician-patient privilege. Rather it appears designed to prevent an extrajudicial breach of the patient's confidence.
Milton S. Marcus
INSURANCE-LOAN RECEIPT-REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
After a loss, the insurance company advanced to the insured the
amount of the loss in return for which the insured executed a "loan
receipt" repayable only to the extent of any net recovery lie might make
against any third party responsible for the loss. In an action by the
insured, the defendant moved to have the insurance company joined as a
necessary plaintiff. Held, the loan did not constitute a payment which
18. See Arizona & New Mexico Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669 (1915).
19. Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D. N.Y. 1940);
Williams v. State, 65 Okla. 336, 86 P.2d 1013 (1939).
20. Woernley v. Electromatic Typewriters Inc., 271 N.Y. 228, 2 N.E.2d 638
(1. 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 247(a) (16th ed. 1899); 8 WIorMORE, EVIDENCE

§ 2380(a) (3d ed. 1940); Chaffee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35

HAv. L.
Rzv. 689 (1922).
22. 1 GREENLEAE, EVIDENCE § 247(a); 8 WIGIORE, EVIDENCE § 2380(a).
23. Curd, Privileged Communications Between The Doctor And His PatientAn Anomaly Of The Law, 44 WVA. L. Q. 165 (1937); Lipscomb, Privileged Communications Statute--Sword And Shield, 16Miss. L. J. 181 (1944); Morgan, Suggested
Remedy For Obstructions To Expert Testimony By Rules Of Evidence, 10 U. of CHI.

L. REV. 285 (1944).

